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Simplifying the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act:
If a Sovereign Acts like a Private Party,
Treat It like One
Joseph F. Morrissey*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 19761 ("FSIA") is confusing
even in its title. While the title suggests that the FSIA is meant to grant immunity
for foreign sovereigns, in fact the FSIA was enacted with the opposite intent.
The FSIA was designed to codify when sovereign immunity is not applicable.2
The FSIA does begin with the enactment of the traditionally accepted premise
that ordinarily foreign governments are immune from the jurisdiction of the
United States.3 However, that general grant of immunity is then subject to
crucial qualifications. 4 As with so much statutory law,' the key to the meaning
and intent of the FSIA is in its exceptions.6

I

2

Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Stetson University College of Law. BA 1989, Princeton
University; JD 1993, Columbia University School of Law. For their thoughtful feedback and
support thanks are due to many colleagues and friends including. Mark Bauer, Howard Eglit,
Tom Fischer, Hal Krent, Marcia McCormick, Mark Montgomery, Dan Morrissey, Mary Rose
Strubbe, and Mary Wilson.
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, Pub L No 94-583, 90 Stat 2891 (1976), codified as amended
at 28 USC §§ 1330, 1391 (b), 1441 (d), 1602-11 (2000) (hereinafter FSIA).
More specifically, the FSIA was passed to codify the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity
which generally limited immunity to situations where the state was acting in its unique capacity as
a government and was not engaged in activities that were of the sort that private parties might
undertake. See House Judiciary Committee, Jurisdiction of United States Courts in Suits Against
Foreign States, HR Rep No 94-1487, 94th Cong, 3d Sess (1976), reprinted in 1976 USCCAN
6604, 6605.

3

28 USC § 1604.

4

28 USC § 1605-07.

s

Compare the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 USC § 78dd-1-dd-3 et seq (2000). That
act sets forth the general rule that foreign corrupt practices are not to be tolerated, but a
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The most important of the exceptions to sovereign immunity is the
commercial activities exception. The commercial activities exception basically
states that a foreign sovereign is not immune from the jurisdiction of United
States courts (including both federal and state courts) where: (i) such foreign
sovereign engages in the kinds of commercial activities that a private party might
undertake; and (ii) that activity has a sufficient connection with the United
States.8
The first part of this analysis-determining when a foreign sovereign is
engaged in commercial activities that a private party might undertake-has
proven problematic for courts.9 The statute itself gives little guidance in this
regard, stating that activities are "commercial" if they represent "either a regular
course of commercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act. '
The circularity of this definition has vexed courts." The statute, however, does
state that commercial activity should be evaluated with regard to the nature of
the activity in question and not its purpose. 2 This distinction has proved helpful
in many circumstances. For example, under the "nature of the activity" analysis,

6

7

8
9

10
11

12

significant exception to that general rule specifically authorizes a certain amount of bribery. See
§ 78dd-1(b).
Those exceptions include the following situations: (a) where a foreign state has waived immunity,
(b) where a foreign state engages in commercial activity like a private party, (c) where a foreign
state violates international law, (d) claims regarding immovable property in the US, (e) claims for
certain "non-commercial" torts, (f) claims regarding arbitral awards, (g) claims regarding certain
types of torture or terrorism, and (h) claims in admiralty. These exceptions are contained in 28
USC § 1605.
The commercial exception is codified at 28 USC § 1605(a)(2). The House Report describing the
FSIA explained that its purpose was to protect private parties who engage in commercial
transactions with foreign sovereigns. The House Report also described the commercial activities
exception of § 1605(a)(2) as "probably the most important instance in which foreign states are
denied immunity." HR Rep No 94-1487, reprinted in 1976 USCCAN at 6617 (cited in note 2). In
addition, the most recent landmark Supreme Court case described the commercial activities
exception as "[t]he most significant of the FSIA's exceptions .... Republic ofAqenina v Weltover,
504 US 607, 611 (1992).
28 USC § 1605(a)(2).
See, for example, Texas Trading & Milling Corp v FederalRepublic of Nigeria,where the court criticizes
the FSIA, stating that "[u]nfortunately, the definition of 'commercial' is the one issue on which
the Act provides almost no guidance at all." 647 F2d 300, 308 (2d Cir 1981). See generally Joan E.
Donoghue, Taking the "Sovereign" out of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: A FunctionalApproach to
the CommercialActivity Exceplion, 17 Yale J Ind L 489 (1992) (detailing the problems of identifying
when a foreign sovereign is engaged in commercial activities for purposes of the FSIA).
28 USC § 1603(d).
See, for example, Weltover, where the Supreme Court stated that the definition of commercial
activity in the FSIA left "commercial" largely undefined. 504 US at 612.
28 USC § 1603(d).
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government procurement would be considered commercial activity even if the
procurement were for a governmental purpose such as military development.13
Still, courts seem better prepared to analyze when activity is commercial
than to confront the second portion of the analysis--determining whether the
activity has a sufficient connection with the United States. Ironically, the FSIA
gives far more guidance on the latter point, but is still confusing.' 4 The FSIA
states that the connection between the cause of action and the United States is
sufficient for jurisdiction if the suit against the foreign sovereign is based on: (i)
commercial activity of the foreign sovereign that has occurred in the United
States; (ii) an act performed in the United States in connection with a
commercial activity of the foreign sovereign elsewhere; or (iii) an act outside of
the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state
elsewhere, which causes a direct effect in the United States."5
Unfortunately, that framework has proven confusing to courts applying
it. 16 The first two scenarios are relatively straightforward. Suits based on actions
that actually occur in the United States clearly have the requisite connection to
the United States to allow courts in the United States to take jurisdiction over
the matter. It is the interpretation of the third clause (the "direct effect clause")
that has resulted in an unclear Supreme Court decision" and a subsequent split
among the federal courts of appeals. 8
Following the Supreme Court case, several of the circuits have insisted that
there must be some legaly significantact in the United States in order for a "direct
effect" to be felt. 19 Others have stuck closer to the "direct effect" words of the
statute and find a direct effect where the effect complained of is the immediate
consequence of the sovereign's actions abroad.2 °
Further complicating the FSIA are the questions of subject matter and
personal jurisdiction. The FSIA states that if an exception to immunity exists in

14

HR Rep No. 94-1487, reprinted in 1976 USCCAN at 6615 (cited in note 2).
28 USC § 1605(a)(2).

15

Id.

16

See, for example, Weltover, 504 US at 612, and its progeny. See Section III.C.

17

Id at 617-20.
See Section II.B.

13

18
19

20

See, for example, Antares Aircraft, LP v Federal Republic of Nigeria, 999 F2d 33, 36 (2d Cir 1993)
(requiring that a legally significant act occur in the United States before a direct effect could be
found to have occurred).
See, for example, Weltover, 504 US at 618 (finding a direct effect where the effect is the immediate
consequence of the actions that are the subject of the suit); Voest-Aopine Trading USA Corp v Bank
of China, 142 F3d 887, 896 (5th Cir 1998) (also using the immediate consequence analysis); see also
Antares Aircraft, 999 F2d at 36 (requiring that a legally significant act occur in the United States
before a direct effect could be found to have occurred).
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the statute, then the courts of the United States will have subject matter
jurisdiction over the suit.2 ' If service of process is made in accordance with the
statute, then personal jurisdiction is also established. 2 In fact, the FSIA seems to
make the inquiry into subject matter and personal jurisdiction regarding a
foreign sovereign very straightforward. Courts applying the FSIA, however, have
been unsure about whether the statute satisfies the constitutional demands of
due process ordinarily contained in a personal jurisdiction analysis. 23 Thus,
several courts, including the Supreme Court, have inquired whether or not the
traditional requirements of the Due Process Clause (namely the minimum
contacts analysis of Internafional Shoe24) have been met before asserting
jurisdiction against a foreign sovereign.25
This Article will first argue that the FSIA has greatly overcomplicated the
matter and will then offer a proposed solution. Essentially, the statute should
simply state that where a foreign sovereign is engaged in commercial activities
like a private party, it should be treated like one. Under this scheme, once this
threshold determination has been made (establishing subject matter jurisdiction
under the FSIA), the courts would simply use the familiar minimum contacts
test they have relied on for decades in order to find personal jurisdiction (or not)
over foreign private party defendants.26 In addition, personal jurisdiction would
not be proper unless service of process was made in accordance with the statute,
as is currently the case.
This proposal would ensure that the conduct complained of in a lawsuit
against a foreign sovereign does have a sufficient connection to the United
States such that due process concerns are not raised. This solution also would

1330(a).

21

28 USC

22

28 USC § 1330(b).

23

The Texas Trading court insisted that due process scrutiny must be made in every case before
jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign may be granted under the FSIA. 647 F2d at 308. However,
the Supreme Court spoke to this issue in Weltover and specifically refused to address whether a
foreign sovereign should be deemed to be a person entitled to the protections of the Due Process
Clause of the United States Constitution. Weltover, 504 US at 619.

24

InternationalShoe Co v Washington, 326 US 310 (1945).

25

Weltover, 504 US at 619-20; Texas Trading, 647 F2d at 313-14; Vermeulen v Renault, USA, Inc, 985
F2d 1534, 1545 (11th Cir 1993).
As will be developed further, it is important that the personal jurisdiction inquiry with respect to a
foreign sovereign be limited to whether specific jurisdiction exists-jurisdiction based on the
actvties alleged in the specific complaint. If general jurisdiction-jurisdiction based on the
general contacts of the defendant to the United States-were allowed then most foreign
sovereigns would always be subject to suit in the United States since most sovereigns have
substantial connections to the United States. See generally Carlos M. V~zquez, The Relationship
between the FSIA's Commercial-Activities Exception and the Due-Process Clause, 85 Am Socy Ind L Proc
257 (1991).

26
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end the confusion and complexity involved with attempting to apply the current
FSIA framework and would make sure that sovereigns acting like private parties
are treated as such.
This Article will begin in Section II by giving an overview of the
development and structure of the FSIA. Section II will explain how the United
States moved from its position in the nineteenth century of absolute sovereign
immunity to the more appropriate restrictive theory of immunity that is
embodied in the FSIA. Section III will then explain in detail why the current
framework of the commercial activities exception to the FSIA is problematic. In
this Section, the leading cases that have attempted to interpret the commercial
activities exception to the FSIA will be analyzed. Finally, Section IV will present
and support an argument for an alternative structure to the commercial activities
exception of the FSIA, a more rational approach that simply treats a foreign
sovereign like a private party when and if it acts like one. While the alternative
structure could and should be introduced by way of a statutory amendment to
the FSIA, this Article will also argue that pending such an amendment, courts
should interpret the language of the current FSIA in a way that leads to the same
results.
II. THE FSIA: ITS DEVELOPMENT AND STRUCTURE
Any history of the evolution of the sovereign immunity doctrine in the
United States must begin with The Schooner Exchange v M{Faddon,27 the landmark
Supreme Court case decided in 1812. The Schooner Exchange held specifically that
the United States did not have jurisdiction over a particular armed ship that was
owned by a foreign sovereign (France) and found in a US port.2 8 Chief Justice
Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court and explained the Court's view that
every nation has "exclusive and absolute" jurisdiction over everything in its own
territory. 29 The Court, however, reasoned that any sovereign within the territory
of another sovereign could only be there under an express or implied license of
immunity from jurisdiction granted by the host nation.3 ° Were this not the case,
then such a sovereign would "degrade the dignity of his nation, by placing [itself]
. . . within the jurisdiction of another," and that was deemed unfeasible.3'
Accordingly, the Court held that the sovereign owner of the vessel was

116 (1812).

27

11 US

28

Id at 147.

29

Id at 136.

30

Id.

31

Id at 137.
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protected by an implied grant of immunity from the jurisdiction of the courts of
the United States.32
Ironically, however, The Schooner Exchange opinion contained dicta that
certain exceptions to sovereign immunity should exist. Chief Justice Marshall
acknowledged, without holding, that the private property of a sovereign acquired
in a host nation would likely not be immune to suit.33 Under this analysis,
Marshall concluded that a prince acting as a private party in this situation "may
be considered as so far laying down the prince, and assuming the character of a
private individual."34 In other words, where a sovereign acts like a private party,
it may be considered to waive its immunity as a sovereign and subject itself to
those laws that would govern a private party. Nonetheless, The Schooner Exchange
has been repeatedly cited for the general principle of absolute sovereign
immunity.35 Absolute immunity for sovereigns thus generally became a part of
the law of the United States.36
Absolute immunity gradually became an anachronism. As governments
increasingly participated in commerce, it seemed inappropriate to relieve those
governmental entities of the obligations and responsibilities that accompanied
private parties engaged in those transactions. By the 1920s, the United States
Supreme Court began to question the principle of absolute immunity. In the
1926 case of Beri.zi Brothers Co v Steamship Pesaro,37 the Supreme Court stated that
The Schooner Exchange did not extend immunity to merchant vessels owned by
foreign sovereigns. The Court reasoned that because there were no such
government owned merchant vessels in 1812, The Schooner Exchange opinion
could not have contemplated immunity for them.3 8 Nonetheless, despite
questioning whether sovereign immunity should be granted in suits concerning
that
such government owned merchant vessels, the Berizi Court did conclude
39
even merchant ships of foreign sovereigns were entitled to immunity.

33

Id at 147.
Idat 145.

34

Id.

35

See, for example, 0lver-American TradingCo v Mexico, 5 F2d 659, 663 (2d Cir 1924).
See Letter from Jack Tate, Acting Legal Adviser to the Secretary of State, to Acting Attorney
General Philip B. Perlman (May 19, 1952), in 26 Dept St Bull 984, 984 (1952) (hereinafter Tate
Letter). In the Tate Letter, the State Department affirmed that "[t]he classical or virtually absolute
theory of sovereign immunity has generally been followed by the courts of the United States ....

32

36

38

271 US 562, 573 (1926).
Id at 573-74.

39

Id at 574.

37
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In Compania Espdnola de Navegaddn Maritima, SA v The Navemar,4° decided in
1938, the Supreme Court pronounced that sovereign immunity was no longer
absolute; instead, it was a prerogative extended by the executive branch of the
United States government. 41 The judiciary would defer to decisions of the
executive branch regarding whether a foreign sovereign should be entitled to
immunity in any given case.42 Compania Espdnola also involved a suit against a
merchant ship allegedly owned by a foreign sovereign-this time the Spanish
government. 43 The Court stated that if the executive branch of the United States
government instructed it to grant the defendant immunity in that case, then it
would, but that otherwise the court was fully competent and authorized to
proceed on the matter.44
In 1945, the Supreme Court again addressed the subject of sovereign
immunity in Republic of Mexico v Hoffman.45 The Hoffman Court discussed the
political sensitivities of an immunity decision and firmly stated that the judiciary
needed to defer to decisions of the executive branch concerning questions of
sovereign immunity. 46 Only in the absence of a decision from the executive
branch regarding immunity in any particular case, would the judiciary consider
the question on its own. 47 Even then, the Hoffman Court cautioned that previous
decisions of the executive branch regarding immunity for the given sovereign
should be given great weight and that "the courts should not so act as to
embarrass the executive arm in its conduct of foreign affairs. ' '48 In Hoffman, the
Executive Branch did not advise the Court as to whether the defendant in that
49
case should be immune from suit, and the Court did in fact deny immunity.
Finally, in 1952, the Department of State declared its outright rejection of
the principle of absolute immunity and its adoption of a restrictive theory of
immunity.50 This declaration occurred in a letter written to the Department of
Justice by Jack Tate, a legal advisor to the State Department. In this renowned
missive (known as the "Tate Letter") Tate explained that granting absolute
immunity to foreign sovereigns was no longer appropriate because foreign

41

303 US 68 (1938).
Id at 74.

42

Id.

40

43

Id.

44

Id at 76.

45

324 US 30 (1945).

46

Id at 34.

47

Id.

48

Id at 35.

49

Id at 38.

50

Tate Letter at 985 (cited in note 36).
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sovereigns were so often engaged in private commerce and that people doing
business with those sovereigns needed and deserved a venue for dispute
resolution.5 Additionally, Tate argued that it had become common practice
around the globe for countries to use this restrictive theory of immunity.52 In
sum, this new restrictive theory of immunity adopted by the Executive Branch
resulted in foreign sovereigns being deemed immune in suits related to their
governmental acts, but not in suits related to their acts in the private commercial
arena. Tate further supported the State Department's shift in position by
explaining that since the United States no longer claimed immunity when sued in
foreign courts for contract or tort claims, it was unfair for foreign sovereigns to
do so. 3
The restrictive theory of sovereign immunity enunciated by Tate in that
famous letter constitutes the basis for the FSIA. Enacted in 1976, the FSIA first
sets forth the general rule that foreign sovereigns are ordinarily immune from
suit in the courts of the United States: "[A] foreign state shall be immune from
and of the States except as
the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States
' 54
provided in sections 1605 to 1607 of this chapter.
The FSIA then sets forth exceptions to the general rule that are the core of
the statute.55 Chief among the exceptions is the commercial activities exception, 56
which is at the heart of the restrictive theory of immunity.5 7 That theory is based
on the premise that when a foreign sovereign engages in private commercial
activities-essentially when a foreign sovereign acts like a private party-it
should be accountable for its actions the way a private party would be, and so
immunity is not appropriate. 58 The commercial activities exception, however, is
not the only exception embodied in the FSIA. Foreign sovereigns also will be
denied immunity in cases where: (a) a foreign state has waived immunity; (b) a
foreign state has violated international law; (c) immovable property in the United
States is at stake; (d) certain "non-commercial" torts have been committed; (e)
arbitral awards are concerned; (f) certain types of torture or terrorism are

51

"[T]he widespread and increasing practice on the part of governments of engaging in commercial
activities makes necessary a practice which will enable persons doing business with them to have
their rights determined in the courts." Id.

52

Id.

53

Id.

54 28 USC § 1604.
55 28 USC §§ 1605-07.
56 28 USC § 1605(a)(2).
57

Tate Letter at 984 (cited in note 36).

58

Id.
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involved; and (g) admiralty issues are present.5 9 Nonetheless, the most important
exception, and the reason the FSIA was enacted, is the commercial activities
exception.6 °
III. THE PROBLEM: CONFUSION WITH THE COMMERCIAL
ACTIVITIES EXCEPTION
The commercial activities exception to the FSIA has created great
confusion and inconsistency in the years since its passage. In particular, courts
have wrestled with how to apply the framework set forth that describes when
the exception should apply. Further, courts do not seem to know whether an
independent analysis under the Due Process Clause is necessary to make sure
that jurisdiction is not taken in violation of the United States Constitution.
A. COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES EXCEPTION OF SECTION
1605(A) (2)
As noted above, the commercial activities exception denies immunity to a
foreign sovereign where: (i) the foreign sovereign engages in commercial
activities; and (ii) those commercial activities have the requisite nexus to the
United States.61 More specifically, the commercial activities exception provides:
A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of
the United States or of the States in any case.., in which the action is based
[i] upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign
state; or
[ii] upon an act performed in the United States in connection with a
commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or
[iii] upon an act outside the territory of the United States in connection with
foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a
a commercial activity of the 62
direct effect in the United States.
Courts have struggled with the first step of the analysis demanded by this
provision: defining what constitutes commercial activity. This struggle seems to
59 28 USC § 1605-07.
60 HR Rep No 94-1487, reprinted in 1976 USCCAN 6604, 6617 (cited in note 2).
61 28 USC § 1605(a)(2).
62 Id (emphasis added).
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be abating, with agreement developing among the courts that activity is
commercial for purposes of this exception where its nature is commercial and
where it is an activity capable of being undertaken by a private party.63 Purpose is
deemed irrelevant.64 Still, ambiguities and challenges exist for the courts in this
regard. Fact patterns abound-from expropriations to governmental trade in
wildlife-involving activities that do not easily lend themselves to
characterizations as either private or governmental.6 5
The focus of this Article, however, is on the second step of the analysis:
whether the commercial activity has the requisite nexus to the United States.
According to the statute, the requisite nexus does exist if the case satisfies one of
three subsections. The first and second subsections have not proven so
problematic as they require a relatively straightforward inquiry: whether or not
the act that forms the basis of the complaint actually occurred in the United
States. The problem has been with the third subsection (the "direct effect
clause"), which requires determining whether an action that occurred outside the
United States has created a direct effect inside the United States sufficient to
warrant jurisdiction.
B. SUPREME COURT ADDRESSES THE COMMERCIAL
ACTIVITIES EXCEPTION IN WELTOVER
In 1992, the United States Supreme Court addressed the question of how
to determine when an act outside the United States causes a direct effect inside
the United States in Republic of Argentina v Weltover.66 However, the Wetover
decision did not provide much clarity on the issue and there has been a split of
opinion at the federal appellate court level about how to interpret Weltover. The
split has yet to be resolved.
The Weltover case involved a conflict between Swiss and Panamanian
holders of Argentinean bonds and the government of Argentina.67 Argentina had
unilaterally decided to reschedule repayment of those bonds and the

63

64
65

See, for example, Texas Trading, 647 F2d at 309 (explaining that "commercial activities" under the
FSIA are those that a private party might undertake); Weltover, 504 US at 614 (reiterating that
commercial activity exists under the FSIA if the activity is of a nature that a private party might
undertake it); Keller v CentralBank of Nigeria, 277 F3d 811, 816 (6th Cir 2002) (holding that activity
is commercial under the FSIA if its nature is such that a private party might engage in it).
See, for example, Weltover, 504 US at 614; Keller, 277 F3d at 816.
See generally Donoghue, 17 Yale J Intl L 489 (cited in note 9) (detailing the problems of
identifying when a foreign sovereign is engaged in commercial activities for purposes of the

FSIA).
66

504 US 607 (1992).

67

Id at 609-10.
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68
bondholders sued on the theory that there had been, a breach of contract.
69
Importantly, the bond terms called for payment in New York. Addressing
whether Argentina was immune from suit under the FSIA, the Supreme Court
held that the commercial activities exception did apply and thus denied
immunity.7" According to the Court, jurisdiction was proper under the
commercial activities exception because: (i) the issuance of the bonds was
1
commercial, given that private parties issue bonds regularly;" and (ii) the direct
effect clause provided the requisite nexus between the action and the United
States. 2 The Court ruled that the direct effect clause was satisfied because the
suit was based on an act that occurred outside of the United States (the unilateral
extension of repayment under the bond contract) that caused a direct effect in the
United States because payment that was scheduled to be made in New York City
was never actually made.73 Hence, money that would have arrived in the United
States did not.74
The Supreme Court took the We/tover case on an appeal from a decision of
7
the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. " The Supreme Court largely
76
agreed with the Second Circuit's analysis of the case but some significant
differences in the two opinions have helped fuel the split amongst the courts of
appeals subsequently attempting to follow Weltover.
The Second Circuit opinion rejected the requirement that some earlier
courts had imposed: for an7 7 effect to be sufficiently "direct," it must be
"substantial and foreseeable." That language was the result of a House Report
that is part of the legislative history of the FSIA. The report stated that conduct
covered by the direct effect clause would be subject to the jurisdiction of
American courts "consistent with principles set forth in section 18, Restatement
' 'T The
of the Law, Second, Foreign Relations Law of the United States (1965).
Second Circuit explained that Section 18 does not provide for extraterritorial
application of American laws except with respect to conduct that has as a "direct

68

Id at 610.

69

Id.

70

Id at 620.

71

Id at 614-15.

72

Id at 619.

73

Id.

74

Id.

75

See We/lover, Inc v Republic ofArgenfina, 941 F2d 145 (2d Cir 1991).
See Weltover, 504 US at 618-19.

76
77
78

We/lover, 941 F2d at 152 (internal citations omitted).
HR Rep No 94-1487 at 19, reprinted in 1976 USCCAN 6604, 6618 (cited in note 2).
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and foreseeable result" a "substantial" effect within the United States.79 The
Second Circuit found that since that Section of the Restatement dealt with
jurisdiction to legislate and not to adjudicate, it was totally inapplicable despite its
inclusion in the House report.8 0 The Supreme Court fully endorsed the Second
Circuit on this point, going as far as to assert that "we reject the suggestion that
§ 1605(a)(2) contains any unexpressed requirement of 'substantiality' or
'foreseeability. ' ' 81 Subsequently, federal appellate courts would rely on this
statement to support a strictly textual reading of the commercial activities
exception."
The Second Circuit then defined "direct effect" by reasoning that an effect
is "direct" if it follows "as an immediate consequence of the defendant's . . .
activity."" Again, the Supreme Court agreed entirely with the Second Circuit on
84
this point.
The Second Circuit, however, had stated in its opinion that courts "often
look to the place where legally significant acts' occurred in order to determine
whether the direct effect of any given action was in the United States.8 5
According to the Second Circuit, in Weltover the "legally significant act" was
Argentina's failure to make payment in New York.86 Thus, the Second Circuit
concluded that a legally significant act occurred in the United States and so a
direct effect must have been felt there.8 7 It is here that the Supreme Court
diverged in an important way from the reasoning of the Second Circuit. In its
Weltover opinion, the Supreme Court was silent regarding the legally significant
act requirement.88 The Supreme Court neither specifically required the search for
a legally significant act in finding a direct effect, nor stated that such an inquiry
was inappropriate.8 9 Because the Supreme Court upheld the Second Circuit
decision in finding that there was a direct effect in the Weltover case, federal
appellate courts in several circuits have implied that the Supreme Court

79

Weltover, 941 F2d at 152.

80

Id.

81

Weltover, 504 US at 618.

82

See, for example, Voest-Apine Trading 142 F3d at 893.

83

Weltover, 941 F2d at 152.

84

Weltover, 504 US at 618.

85

Weltover, 941 F2d at 152 (emphasis added).

86

Id at 153.

87
88

Id.
Weltover, 504 US 607 (1992).

89

Id.
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implicitly adopted the legally significant act test.90 Other circuits point out that
since the Supreme Court did not so much as mention a legally significant act in
its Weltover decision, its opinion cannot possibly be construed to require one.9'
C. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT DEVELOPS REGARDING THE DIRECT
EFFECT CLAUSE
The Weltover decision ignited confusion and controversy over whether the
direct effect clause mandates a finding of a legally significant act in the United
States. As a result, various federal appellate courts used different modes of
analysis to interpret the direct effect clause.
In the immediate wake of the Supreme Court's Weltover decision, the
Second Circuit repeated in Antares Aircraft, LP v FederalRepublic of Nigeria that it
was necessary to find a legally significant act.92 The Antares Court insisted that in
order to find a "direct effect" under the commercial activities exception, there
had to be a "legally significant actn" in the United States-the same stance it had
taken in Wleltover.93 Antares originally had been decided by the Second Circuit just
before the Weltover Supreme Court case. The case was appealed to the Supreme
Court, which then remanded it to the Second Circuit for a decision in
accordance with the Supreme Court's Weltover ruling.94 In Antares, the Second
Circuit reasoned that although the Supreme Court had not expressly adopted the
legally significant acts test, the Supreme Court did use a similar analysis and
therefore endorsed the test.95
As late as 1998, in Filetech SA v France Telecom SA, the Second Circuit
reiterated its position that a legally significant act test is required. 96 "This test
requires that the conduct having a direct effect in the United States be legally
apply., 97
significant conduct in order for the commercial activity exception to
Despite the language of Antares and Filetech, even the Second Circuit has
not consistently used the legally significant act test. In a 1994 ruling, Commercial

90

See, for example, Antares Aircraft, 999 F2d at 36; United World Trade v Mangtshlakneft Oil Production
Assn, 33 F3d 1232, 1239 (10th Cir 1994); see also GeneralElectric CapitalCo?p v Grossman, 991 F2d
1376, 1385 (8th Cir 1993).

91

See, for example, Voest-Apine Trading, 142 F3d at 894; see also Keller, 277 F3d at 818.

92

See Antares Aircraft, 999 F2d at 36.

93

Id.

94

96

Antares Aircraft,LP v FederalRepublic of Nigeria, 505 US 1215 (1992).
Antares, 999 F2d at 36. The Supreme Court denied certiorari when the case again was appealed.
Antares Aircraft, LP v FederalRepublic of Nigeria, 510 US 1071 (1994).
157 F3d 922, 931 (2d Cir 1998).

97

Id.

95
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Bank of Kuwait v Rafidain Bank,98 the court deemed that the direct effect test was
applicable without ever mentioning whether there was a legally significant act in
the United States that gave rise to the direct effect.99
Both the Eighth and Tenth Circuits also ruled on this issue in the
immediate aftermath of Weltover.'00 Both courts cited to the legally significant
acts test as being useful, but neither specifically stated that it was required.' °'
Rather, both courts referred to the language used by the Second Circuit in
Weltover, observing that "courts often look to the place where legally significant
acts" occurred in order to determine where a direct effect occurred.'0 2 Based on
this language, it seems that the Eighth and Tenth Circuits view the legally
significant act test as one way of finding a direct effect, but not the only way.
However, other federal appellate courts have cited these Eighth and Tenth
Circuit cases as precedent for the proposition that a legally significant act is
required in order to find a direct effect under the FSIA.0 3 For example, in 1997,
the Ninth Circuit, in Adler v the FederalRepublic of Nigeria,'O4 noted that the Second
Circuit still required the legally significant acts test.'0 5 The Ninth Circuit also
observed that the Tenth Circuit "has followed the Second [Circuit] in applying
the 'legally significant acts' test" and that the Eighth Circuit has "acknowledged
the test's survival."' 0 6 The Ninth Circuit may have been wrong in its
characterization of the Eighth and Tenth Circuits' analyses of the legally
significant act test-reading those cases as requiring the test rather than just
suggesting that the analysis could be helpful if used-but the cases are
somewhat ambiguous, and the Ninth Circuit's confusion is understandable.
In any event, the Adler court cited precedent from its own jurisdiction that
contained specific language saying that a legally significant act is indeed required
in order to find a direct effect under the FSIA. 07 In the 1989 case Gregorian v
Izvestia, 08 the Ninth Circuit had stated that "to establish a 'direct effect' in the
United States resulting from an act occurring abroad, a plaintiff must establish
98

15 F3d 238 (2d Cir 1994).

99

Id at 241.

100 United World Trade, 33 F3d at 1239; General Electric,991 F2d at 1385.
101

United World Trade, 33 F3d at 1239; GeneralElectric,991 F2d at 1385.

United World Trade, 33 F3d at 1239 (internal citations omitted); GeneralElectric, 991 F2d at 1385,
quoting Weltover, 941 F2d at 152.
103 See, for example, Adler v FederalRepublic ofNigeria, 107 F3d 720, 727 (9th Cir 1997).
102

104

Id.

105 Id.
106 Id at 727 n 4, citing United World Trade, 33 F3d at 1239; GeneralElectric,991 F2d at 1385.
107 Adler, 107 F3d at 727, citing Gregorian v lzyestia, 871 F2d 1515, 1527 (9th Cir 1989).
108 Gregorian, 871 F2d at 1527.
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that 'something legally significant actually happened in the U.S.""' 10 9 That
precedent, however, predated the Supreme Court's decision in Weltover. The
1997 Adler court cited to Gregorian and to the Eighth and Tenth Circuit
precedents, but never did go so far as to specifically rule again that the legally
significant acts test was required-nor did it even specifically employ the test in
its analysis." 0 However, it also did not expressly overrule Gregorian."' So, it
seems that the test survives as a requirement in the Ninth Circuit. The Adler
court's hesitancy to specifically reaffirm the test as a requirement, however, may
indicate the Ninth Circuit's uncertainty regarding the issue.
Other federal appellate courts, namely those of the Fifth and Sixth Circuits,
have ruled categorically that identifying a legally significant act in the United
States is not required by the FSIA's direct effect clause." 2 In Voest-Alpine Trading
USA Corp v Bank of China,' 3 the Fifth Circuit reasoned that inasmuch as the
Supreme Court did not mandate such an inquiry in Weltover, it is not required."'
Further, the Voest-Alpine court pointed to the language from the Supreme Court
in Weltover where the Court rejected the injection of any unexpressed terms into
the language of the statute."'
The Voest-A~oine court also went through a careful structural analysis of the
commercial activities exception to show that if a legally significant act were to be
required under the direct effect clause, then the direct effect clause would merge
into the second clause of the commercial activities exception." 6 The second
clause allows for jurisdiction where the lawsuit is based on an act performed in
the United States in connection with commercial activity of the defendant
outside of the United States." 7 If a legally significant act in the United States
were to be required for the direct effect clause, then the direct effect clause
would only be triggered where the action was based on an act that occurred
outside the United States that caused another legally significant act to occur inside

109 Id, quoting Zedan v Kingdom of SaudiArabia,849 F2d 1511, 1515 (DC Cir 1988).
110 Ultimately, the Adler court's analysis was based on an analogy between its fact pattern and the fact
pattern of Weltover. Both cases involved payments that should have been made in New York
under contract but that were never made. Since the facts were similar, the result was the same.
Adler, 107 F3d at 727.
111 Id.
112 Voest-A oine, 142 F3d at 894; Keller, 277 F3d at 818.
113
114

142 F3d 887 (5th Cir 1998).
Id at 894.

115 Id.
116
117

Id at 895.
28 USC § 1605(a)(2).
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the United States." 8 The Fifth Circuit reasoned that this reformulation of the
direct effect clause makes it merely a more stringent version of the second
clause.'19 Under both clauses, the lawsuit would require some act that occurred
in the United States that was connected to commercial activity abroad. 2 ' The
Fifth Circuit reasoned that the FSIA would not have been written in such a way
as to render one clause redundant of another.'
The Sixth Circuit ruled on this point in 2002 in Keller v Central Bank of
Nigeria.122 The Keller court reviewed various federal appellate courts' positions on
the legally significant act test and found that the Second, Ninth, and Tenth
Circuits had adopted the legally significant acts test,123 while the Fifth Circuit had
rejected the test in Voest-Apine.124 The Sixth Circuit joined the Fifth Circuit,
agreeing that "the addition of unexpressed requirements to the statute is
' 12
unnecessary, and... decin[ing] ...to adopt the 'legally significant acts' test. 1
In sum, in the wake of Weltover, federal appellate courts have taken various
approaches to interpreting the direct effect clause of the commercial activities
exception to the FSIA. The Second Circuit has affirmed the legally significant act
test as a requirement in order to find a direct effect.'26 The Ninth Circuit seems
to agree. 27 The Eighth and Tenth Circuits have stated that the test can be
helpful in finding a direct effect but have not gone so far as to specifically
require the test (notwithstanding the Ninth Circuit's characterization of cases
from those circuits as requiring the test). 28 Finally, the Fifth and Sixth Circuits
clearly have ruled that the test is not required. 2 9

118

Voest-Apine Trading, 142 F3d at 895.

119

Id.

120

Id.

121

Id.

122

277 F3d 811, 818 (6th Cir 2002).

123

124

Id at 817, citing Antares Aircraft, 999 F2d at 36; Adler, 107 F3d at 727; and United World Trade, 33
F3d at 1239. Again, it is arguable whether the Tenth Circuit required the legally significant acts
test or simply acknowledged that it can be helpful when trying to determine whether a direct
effect in the United States exists. See Section III.C.
Id at 818.

125

Id.

126

See AntaresAircraft, 999 F2d at 35.

127

See Adler, 107 F3d at 727.

128

See GeneralElecric,991 F2d at 1385; see also United World Trade, 33 F3d at 1239.

129

See Voest-Aoine, 142 F3d at 894; Keller,277 F3d at 818.
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D. DUE PROCESS CONCERNS COMPLICATE THINGS FURTHER
Complicating matters even further is the question of whether foreign
sovereigns should be given the due process protections of the United States
Constitution. Personal jurisdiction over a private party defendant is not proper
in the United States if such jurisdiction would violate the private party's due
process rights. 3 ° Those rights are protected by the due process protections of
the United States Constitution, which affirm that no state shall "deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."''
The classic case regarding the due process concerns embodied in personal
jurisdiction is InternationalShoe.'32 In that case, the Supreme Court explained that
a court's jurisdiction over a person was traditionally grounded on the fact that
the person could be physically found within the geographical jurisdiction of the
court, and therefore should expect to be held accountable to that court.'33 But
where the defendant is not actually located within a court's geographical
jurisdiction, the constitutional guarantee of due process of law requires only that
such person have minimum contacts with that jurisdiction such that the suit
3' 4
"does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.""
Accordingly, personal jurisdiction questions regarding private parties routinely
entail a minimum contacts analysis to ensure that due process concerns have
35
been addressed.
The due process minimum contacts analysis of personal jurisdiction can be
satisfied in one of two ways: either by establishing (i) general jurisdiction, or (ii)
specific jurisdiction. 36 General jurisdiction is established when a defendant has
sufficient minimum contacts with the United States such that summoning that
defendant into court in the United States would not offend traditional notions of
fairness. 3 7 Specific jurisdiction, on the other hand, is established where the
subject matter of the alleged complaint has sufficient contacts with the United
States to justify jurisdiction.131 With private party defendants, a finding of either

130 IntemationalShoe, 326 US at 316. Note that this case involved the due process protections of the
Fourteenth Amendment, which takes the due process protections of the Fifth Amendment and
makes them applicable to the states.
131 US Const, amend XIV, § 1; see also US Const, amend V.
132

InternationalShoe,326 US at 316.

133

Id at 316.

134

Id, quoting Milliken vMeyer, 311 US 457, 463 (1940).

135

Id; see also Heicdperos Nadonales de Colombia, SA v Hall,466 US 408, 414 (1984).

136

Helicdpteros, 466 US at 414 nn 8, 9.

137 Idat414.
138

Id at 414 n 8.
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personal jurisdiction suffices to satisfy constitutional due
general or specific
1 39
concerns.
process
The distinction between general and specific jurisdiction is crucial to
consider when contemplating a due process minimum contacts analysis with
respect to foreign sovereigns. Foreign sovereigns, by their very nature, virtually
always maintain general diplomatic and economic contacts with other
sovereigns, including the United States. General jurisdiction over a foreign
sovereign would thus virtually always exist (the rare exception would be a
country that did not have any diplomatic or other relationship with the United
States). Therefore, to allow for general jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign to
satisfy due process concerns would thus be the equivalent of not requiring the
test at all. 140 Under this analysis, any foreign sovereign who engaged in
commercial activities could be called into a United States court. The United
States would become the world court for commercial disputes against
sovereigns. This result is one that the FSIA was trying to prevent in the first
place by describing the very limited circumstances in which the United States
could appropriately exercise jurisdiction against a foreign sovereign-in other
words, when the specific action complained of in a suit against a foreign
sovereign has a sufficient nexus to the United States. To allow for jurisdiction
over a sovereign without a connection between the action complained of and
the United States would surely undermine the United States' relationship with
sovereigns around the world.14 ' Accordingly, where a due process minimum
contacts analysis is performed regarding a foreign sovereign, the analysis should
be confined to whether specific jurisdiction exists.
E. AMBIGUITY OVER WHETHER THE FSIA REQUIRES A DUE
PROCESS ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court in We/tover, and at least two federal appellate courts,
undertook a personal jurisdiction due process analysis of whether it is
permissible under the commercial activities exception of the FSIA to exert
jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign. 4 ' Only one of these courts actually stated
that the due process analysis is required, and none of the courts addressed the

139

Idat414.

140

See generally Vazquez, 85 Am Socy Ind L 257 (cited in note 26).

141

In this regard, it should be remembered that many nations around the world engage in a broad
array of commercial activities that the United States does not. Controlled economies of the
developing world are just one example where the government provides commercial services that
the United States would typically deem to be of the sort that a private party would undertake.
Weltover, 504 US at 619; Texas Trading,647 F2d at 308; Vermeulen, 985 F2d at 1545.

142
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important distinction between applying general versus specific jurisdiction over a
foreign sovereign.
In the 1981 Texas Trading case, the Second Circuit commented that the
FSIA seems to make subject matter and personal jurisdiction a simple matter of
satisfying the statute.' Subject matter jurisdiction is appropriate if an exception
to immunity applies, while personal jurisdiction is said to exist if subject matter
jurisdiction and service of process has occurred under the statute.' However,
the Texas Trading court stated that even the FSIA "cannot create personal
jurisdiction where the Constitution forbids it.' 14 The court went on to explain
that personal jurisdiction affords the due process safeguards of the Constitution
to any person brought before a United States court.116 The question was whether
a foreign sovereign should be considered a person for the sake of this analysis. 47
The Texas Trading court ruled that it should be, without much discussion other
148
than to say that there was not much precedent on point.
The Texas Trading court then proceeded with its due process analysis-a
minimum contacts analysis under the InternationalShoe case. 149 Noticeably absent
from the court's due process analysis, however, was any discussion of, or
distinction between, general and specific jurisdiction.' 0 The Second Circuit's
analysis seemed to be based on the foreign sovereign defendant's general
contacts with the United States.' The Texas Trading court found minimum
contacts to exist between the foreign sovereign and the United States in that case
because the foreign sovereign sent employees to New York for training, kept
cash in New York and maintained a custody account there. 2 None of these
contacts were specifically relevant to the claim under consideration (breach of a
cement supply contract) .is

Armed with the Second Circuit's decision regarding due process and
foreign sovereigns in Texas Trading, the Supreme Court addressed the question
head-on in Weltover by specifically refusing to decide the issue. 1 4 In Weltover, the
143 Texas Trading 647 F2d at 308.
144

28 USC § 1330.

145 Texas Trading, 647 F2d at 308.
146

Id.

147 Idat 313.
148

Id.

149 Id at 314.
150

Id.

151

Id.

152

Id.

153 Id.

154 Weltover, 504 US at 619.
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Supreme Court declined to rule on whether foreign sovereigns would be covered
by the protections of the Constitution, but went through the due process
analysis anyway just to make sure that due process was not offended assuming
that the protections did apply.155 The Weltover Court then did a quick minimum
contacts analysis of that case to find that due process would not be offended if
iurisdiction were asserted. 5 6 As in Texas Trading, however, the Weltover Court
never made any mention of the distinction between finding general and specific
57
personal jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign under the Due Process Clause.' It
did, however, confine its analysis to contacts that were specific to the transaction
in question, citing that in the bond transaction, Argentina issued debt
denominated in US dollars payable in New York, and had a financial agent in
New York)5 8 All of these contacts were, according to the Court, sufficient to
maintain personal jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause.'59
Post-Weltover, the Eleventh Circuit performed the same due process
analysis in Vermeulen v Renault, USA, Inc.'6 ° Relying on Weltover, the Vermeulen
court stated that since the direct effects analysis "might be" construed as
embodying the constraints of due process, the court should go through the
analysis just to be sure that such an analysis was satisfied. 6 ' Unlike the courts in
Texas Trading and Weltover before it, the Vermeulen court did specify that it was
62
undertaking a due process analysis to establish specific personal jurisdiction.
Still, it gave no explanation for why it proceeded to establish specific jurisdiction
instead of general jurisdiction. 163 In addition, just like the Supreme Court in
Weltover, the Eleventh Circuit in Vermeulen went through a due process analysis
161
without answering the question of whether such an analysis was necessary.

155 Id ("Assuming without deciding, that a foreign state is a 'person' for purposes of the Due Process

Clause...

.

156

Id at 619-20.

157

Id.

158

Id.

159

Id at 619.

160

985 F2d 1534, 1545 (11th Cir 1993).

161

Id.

162

Id.

163

Id.

164

Id. The Second Circuit also addressed the due process concerns of the FSIA subsequent to
Weltover in Hanil Bank v PT Bank Negara Indonesia, 148 F3d 127, 134 (2d Cir 1998). In that case the
Second Circuit stated that it was unclear whether their Texas Tradingcase was still good law with
respect to considering a foreign sovereign a person for purposes of the due process clause. Like
the Vermeulen Court, the Hanil Court went through the analysis anyway, assuming that it was
required and found due process concerns to have been met.
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F. CONFUSION AND AMBIGUITY PERSISTS
As the foregoing discussion has shown, confusion and ambiguity are still
rampant in the interpretation of the commercial activities exception of the FSIA.
Weltover attempted to answer the question of when an action outside of the
United States causes a direct effect inside the United States sufficient to warrant
jurisdiction in any given case. 65 Nonetheless, because the Court did not directly
address whether finding a legally significant act to have occurred in the United
States is required in order to find a direct effect, confusion persists. Subsequent
federal circuit court decisions indicate dissatisfaction with the guidance given by
Weltover and confusion about how to apply the standard. Some require a legally
significant act to have occurred in the United States before a direct effect can be
found.166 Others insist that such a requirement is not part of the statutory
analysis. 67
Additionally, in 1981 the Second Circuit indicated in Texas Trading that a
due process analysis was required in order to make sure that jurisdiction was
constitutional. 16' However, the Supreme Court in Weltover specifically declined to
say whether such an inquiry was required, but then undertook the inquiry
anyway. 169 This led courts to avoid the inquiry, although at least two federal
circuit cases decided after Weltover followed, the Supreme Court and undertook
the inquiry just in case it was necessary. 7 ° None of the cases undertaking the due
process minimum contacts analysis explained the importance of the distinction
between finding general versus specific jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns.
Moreover, under the current FSIA rules, foreign sovereigns acting like
private parties are subjected to a different analysis than their private party
counterparts. In fact, in cases against a foreign sovereign where the court does
not insist on a due process inquiry, the standards being applied to sovereigns are
potentially more lax than those being applied to private parties. The FSIA
"direct effect" analysis-whether actions abroad have a "direct effect" in the
United States'17'-could be answered differently than the constitutional analysis
applied to private parties-whether the foreign private party or the action
complained about has such minimum contacts with the United States that to

165

Weltover, 504 US at 618-19.

166

See, for example, AntaresAin-raft, 999 F2d at 36; Adler, 107 F3d at 727.

167

See, for example, Voest-Apine, 142 F3d at 894; Keller, 277 F3d at 818.

168

Texas Trading, 647 F2d at 308.

169

Weltover, 504 US at 619-20.

170

Vermeulen, 985 F2d at 1545; Hani, 148 F3d at134.

171

28 USC 5 1605(a)(2).
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maintain a suit would not offend traditional notions of justice.172 The former
"direct effect" requirement may be easier to satisfy than the minimum contacts
analysis. 73 Accordingly, a foreign sovereign might actually be subjected to
jurisdiction where a private party would not be. 174 Inasmuch as the theories of
sovereign immunity have attempted to treat sovereigns deferentially in the
interest of international relations, to have a statutory scheme that treats
sovereigns with less deference than private parties seems absurd.
IV. THE SOLUTION: TREAT SOVEREIGNS ENGAGED IN
COMMERCE LIKE PRIVATE PARTIES
Given the confusion that still exists with respect to the commercial
activities exception to the FSIA and the political sensitivity involved with its
analysis, a new framework is necessary. The FSIA should provide clear and
coherent instructions so that courts can objectively and consistently apply the
law to provide immunity when it is appropriate, but deny immunity when it is
inappropriate. This Article proposes a solution that would drop the confusing
framework set forth currently in the commercial activities exception and use the
more familiar minimum contacts analysis that courts have used for decades with
respect to foreign private parties. This solution would be best implemented by
amending the FSIA. However, pending any legislative amendment, courts can
and should bring a similar analysis to the FSIA, even as it is currently worded.
A. LEGISLATIVE REFORM
The FSIA should state preliminarily that in order to exert jurisdiction over
a foreign sovereign, US courts need to establish both subject matter and
personal jurisdiction. This is only different from the current statute in that it
would specifically state that such an analysis must be satisfied with respect to
foreign sovereigns. It also establishes the two-step inquiry into whether
jurisdiction over a sovereign is proper.
The first step of the analysis would be whether subject matter jurisdiction
exists. The FSIA would continue to state that in order to find subject matter
jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign, one of the exceptions set forth in the FSIA
172

Helicdpteros, 466 US at 414.

173

This position relies on the crucial assumption that the appropriate minimum contacts analysis
regarding a foreign sovereign would be a specific jurisdiction inquiry into whether the specific
actions that are the subject of the lawsuit have such minimum contacts that exerting jurisdiction
would not offend traditional notions of justice. To allow for a general jurisdiction analysis
regarding foreign sovereigns makes the inquiry useless since virtually every foreign sovereign in
the world has certain general minimum contacts with the United States.
This concept will be illustrated through the use of examples in Section JV.C.

174
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must apply. This is the way the FSIA currently works so it will not affect
analyses under the other exceptions to the FSIA. The revised commercial
activities exception proposed here, however, would specifically state that it
would apply to a foreign sovereign-indicating that subject matter jurisdiction is
appropriate-where that sovereign engages in either a regular course of
commercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction -or act. Those
activities would continue to be evaluated with reference to their nature, rather
than their purpose, and should be such that a private party might engage in
them. That is also similar to the way the FSIA works now. 75 If a foreign
sovereign engages in private commercial activities, then subject matter
jurisdiction under the exception would be satisfied.
In the second step of the analysis, a court would need to establish personal
jurisdiction. The commercial activities exception would be revised so that
personal jurisdiction would not merely require service of process under the
FSIA, as is currently the case.' 76 Instead, under the revised commercial activities
exception, courts would have personal jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign only
if a specific jurisdiction minimum contacts analysis is satisfied and service of
process is correctly made under the statute. This revised scheme would do away
with the three categories the FSIA currently sets forth to establish the necessary
nexus between a foreign sovereign's commercial activities and the United
States.'77 As was described above, that framework has proved difficult for courts
to apply and has yielded no consensus among the courts regarding how to apply
it.
Perhaps more importantly, the revised commercial activities exception
would codify that foreign sovereigns should be treated essentially like foreign
private parties for purposes of constitutional due process concerns. 78 The
revised commercial activities exception, though, would make clear that
establishing personal jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign would involve an
inquiry into only the specific jurisdiction aspect of personal jurisdiction.
Sovereigns by nature are involved in international diplomacy. Thus sovereigns
by their nature would almost always have sufficient general contacts with the
United States to satisfy a general jurisdiction analysis, making a general
jurisdiction analysis meaningless. 179 In the context of foreign sovereigns, the
personal jurisdiction inquiry must be limited to a specific jurisdiction analysis in
recognition of the underlying character of a sovereign.

176

See 28 USC § 1603(d).
See 28 USC § 1330(b).

177

28 USC § 1605(a)(2).

178

US Const, amend XIV, § 1.

179

See generally Vizquez, 85 Am Socy Intl L Proc 257 (cited in note 26).

17

Winter 2005

ChicagoJournalof InternadionalLaw

There is a deep well of cases that have addressed the minimum contacts
analysis. One particularly relevant Supreme Court case concerning private parties
is Asahi Metal Indus Co v Super Ct of California 8 ° In Asahi, the Supreme Court
outlined a plethora of concerns that inform a specific jurisdiction minimum
contacts analysis with respect to foreign private parties.18' It is not simply that a
defendant's actions should have minimum contacts with the United States, but
that those contacts be such that exercising jurisdiction over the defendant would
not offend traditional notions of fairness. 82 The concerns implicit in that
analysis include, but are not limited to: (i) the burden to the defendant of being
called into a United States court; (ii) the interest of the plaintiff in relief; (iii) the
United States' interest in hearing the case; (iv) questions of efficiency; and (v) the
potential implications for United States foreign policy.'83 Courts should apply the
same concerns to an inquiry into whether specific personal jurisdiction over a
foreign sovereign is appropriate.
B. PROPOSED REVISION
In accordance with the preceding discussion, a revised commercial
activities exception might read as follows:
1605 (a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of the
courts of the United States or of the States in any case in which both subject
matter and personal jurisdiction exist with respect to that foreign state in
accordance with this Section....
(2) (i) Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1330(a), subject matter jurisdiction will
exist in all cases in which the action against the foreign state is based upon
such state's commercial activities; and (ii) personal jurisdiction will exist if
the demands of specific personal jurisdiction are met satisfying the due
process concerns of the United States Constitution and service of process
has made in accordance with section 1608 of this title.
Commercial activities would continue to be defined as it is now in Section

1603(d):
A "commercial activity" means either a regular course of commercial
conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act. The commercial
character of an activity shall be determined by reference to the nature of the
course of conduct or particular transaction or act, rather than by reference
to its purpose.

180

480 US 102 (1987).

181 Id at 113.
182

Id.

183

Id.

Vol. 5 No. 2

Simplifiing the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act

Morrissgy

The jurisdictional grant of 28 USC § 1330(b) would have to be amended slightly
as well so that personal jurisdiction is not satisfied by only showing that service
of process has been made in accordance with Section 1608. A revised Section
1330(b) might read:
Except as section 1605 othenvise requires, personal jurisdiction over a foreign
state shall exist as to every claim for relief over which the district courts
have jurisdiction under subsection (a) where service has been made under
section 1608 of this title. [Additional proposed language indicated in italics.]
C. WELTOVER AS AN EXAMPLE CASE
Two examples should help to illustrate how the revised FSIA would work
and how it might yield different results from the current FSIA. First, in order to
illustrate the importance of limiting the personal jurisdiction analysis to specific
jurisdiction, take, for example, the facts of the Weltover case.' The plaintiffs are
Panamanian and Swiss; the defendant is Argentina. The suit involves default
over nonpayment of bonds issued to the plaintiffs. Imagine, however, that the
bond contract never called for payment in New York. If a general jurisdiction
analysis were allowed to satisfy personal jurisdiction, then a United States court
could proceed to find, first, that subject matter jurisdiction was established, since
Argentina was engaging in private commercial activities. Second, the court could
easily find that Argentina has such general contacts with the United States that it
would not offend traditional notions of justice to call Argentina into court in the
United States. (The general contacts might consist of Argentina's embassy and
consulates in the United States, or bank accounts that the Argentine government
has in the United States.)
Exercising jurisdiction over Argentina in this example would be the wrong
result. In cases such as this, the United States would end up hearing cases that
did not involve the United States in any meaningful way. If general jurisdiction
were allowed to be the rule, then the United States could truly become the
world's commercial court. 8 '
On the other hand, by restricting the personal jurisdiction analysis to
specific jurisdiction, a court would not be able to establish jurisdiction over the
foreign sovereign in this example. A court would still go through the two-step
analysis. Under the first step, private commercial activity would still be found
and subject matter jurisdiction would be satisfied. Under the second step,

184

Weltover, 504 US 607.

185

Some might argue that in fact the United States should welcome the opportunity to become the
world's commercial court, and that it is cases just such as these that are crucial to upholding the
integrity of global financial markets. The United States Constitution simply does not ascribe that
role to the courts of the United States. US Const, art III, § 2, cl 1.
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however, personal jurisdiction could not be satisfied by a specific jurisdictional
inquiry since nothing in the specifics of the bond deal under scrutiny was even
minimally connected to the United States. Since there would be no specific
minimum contacts, there could be no personal jurisdiction and the defendant
would still be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States.
Under the current FSIA, it would be difficult to find a direct effect in the
United States with these facts, and so the result would likely be the same under
the current FSIA as it would be under the proposed revised FSIA. Consider the
original facts of the Weltover decision, though, where payment was to have been
made in US dollars and could have been made under the contract in one of
several locations, including New York.'86 As the case was decided, the Court
found a direct effect in that the payment that was supposed to arrive in the
United States did not, and jurisdiction over Argentina was found to be proper
under the FSIA. 8 7 Under the revised FSIA proposed here, it is very possible that
the Court would have come to the opposite conclusion.
The revised FSIA would instruct the Supreme Court to engage in a specific
jurisdictional analysis of this case in the way that it had undertaken that analysis
with respect to foreign private parties in Asahi. The court would need to identify
the contacts from the specific controversy and then decide whether those
contacts were such that maintaining a suit against the defendant would not
offend traditional notions of justice. A variety of concerns would need to be
balanced in this decision. The contacts in this situation include Argentina
denominating its bonds in United States currency, and money under the contract
to be paid to a New York bank. Concerns include the interest of the United
States in hearing this dispute. In fact, the United States' interest in the
controversy would be minimal since the plaintiffs were not United States
citizens. Further, the money that was supposed to arrive in New York in
payment of the bonds would have quickly been transferred back out of the
United States to the foreign plaintiffs. It is difficult to imagine why the interests
of justice or the United States would lead to the US exercising jurisdiction under
this analysis. In Asahi, the Court found that a foreign company's products being
in the US stream of commerce and contributing to an accident that injured a US
citizen was not sufficient to warrant bringing an Asian manufacturer into the
courts of the United States.' 88 The contacts in Weltover appear to be of much less
interest to the United States than those in Asahi.189 Since the Court refused to
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exercise jurisdiction over the private party in Asahi, the Court is likely to refuse
jurisdiction in cases such as the one considered here.
This case analysis shows that, in fact, the current commercial activities
exception may result in jurisdiction being appropriate more often than under the
minimum contacts analysis that is proposed here. As was described, the current
FSIA led to the United States exercising jurisdiction over Argentina while a
minimum contacts analysis might not have. To the extent that the FSIA was
designed to codify deferential treatment of foreign sovereigns, this example
illustrates the opposite result-that the foreign sovereign is treated less
deferentially than a private party. This cannot be the result intended and
illustrates another argument in favor of reform. The standard for exercising
jurisdiction over a sovereign engaging in commercial activities like a private party
should be the same.standard applied to a private party in the same situation.
D. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION PENDING LEGISLATIVE
REFORM-SOVEREIGNS SHOULD BE GIVEN CONSTITUTIONAL
DUE PROCESS PROTECTIONS.
Since Congress is not likely to amend the FSIA anytime soon, it is
important that the courts move to an interpretative position on the commercial
activities exception to the FSIA that is both coherent and consistent. Such a
position can and should be consonant with the proposal to revise the FSIA set
forth above. The appropriate judicial analysis in applying the FSIA to achieve
this result would involve courts undertaking both the statutory and
constitutional analysis of whether jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign is
appropriate.
Both the scheme proposed and the current statute first ask whether the
foreign sovereign has engaged in private commercial activity. This part of the
analysis is the same under both schemes.
Under the currently enacted statute, however, courts then have to confront
whether the commercial activities have the requisite nexus with the United States
through the three prongs of Section 1605(a)(2). 90 Again, the first two prongs are
relatively straightforward and find the required nexus where at least some of the

needed to be made. 504 US at 619. The analysis of the Supreme Court there seems superficial and
not nearly as rigorous as the one conducted with respect to the private foreign party in Asahi. It
may be that the Supreme Court simply wanted to come up with an answer to its minimum
contacts analysis that agreed with its analysis under the direct effect clause. Were the Court to be
confronted with a statute that instructed it to perform a specific minimum contacts analysis, the
result described here might indeed ensue.
190 28 USC § 1605(a)(2).
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action has actually occurred in the United States.' The third prong finds the
required nexus when the action occurred outside of the United States if that
action caused a direct effect inside the United States.'92 Admittedly, the inquiry
into whether an action is sufficiently direct and sufficiently in the United States
is a vague one and is difficult to conduct, but courts can take guidance from
whether or not they can establish specific personal jurisdiction under a
traditional minimum contacts analysis. The answer to both questions should be
the same. If specific jurisdiction exists under the specific jurisdiction minimum
contacts test, then the activities complained about that occurred outside of the
United States should also be found to have the requisite direct effect in the
United States. There should be no way to find sufficient minimum contacts
between an action complained of and the United States, and then not find that
such an action also caused a direct effect in the United States.
Secondly, courts should undertake the specific jurisdiction minimum
contacts analysis regardless of which of the three prongs of the commercial
activity exception is being used. This is justified on the basis that (as the Texas
Trading court stated) the FSIA cannot provide for personal jurisdiction where the
Due Process Clause would not allow it.'93 Texas Trading provides federal
appellate court precedent that such an analysis is required. While the Supreme
Court itself, in Weltover, avoided answering whether this analysis was required
with respect to foreign sovereigns, it actually went through the analysis assuming
that it might be required.'94 With the Texas Trading court requiring the analysis,
and the Supreme Court unwilling to deny that the analysis was required,
subsequent courts could easily require the inquiry. As was described above, at
least one federal circuit court used the specific personal jurisdiction analysis after
Wetover (though that court also simply assumed that it was required without
ruling that it was). 9 5
Further buttressing future judicial decisions finding due process protection
for sovereigns is the argument that since the United States has generally treated
sovereigns with more deference than private parties, the United States should
provide sovereigns with at least the same protections it provides to foreign
individuals. Again, where the prince lays down his crown and acts like a private
party, he should be treated like one-including being given constitutional due
process protections.
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In their due process analyses, courts should apply to foreign sovereigns the
same rigorous specific jurisdiction analysis that the Supreme Court used in Asahi
with respect to foreign private parties. This includes weighing the interests of the
United States in hearing the case against the interests of the plaintiffs and
defendants in having the case heard or dismissed. Diplomatic concerns can be
considered in this inquiry.'96 Thus, the result is a flexible rule that can bend to
apply to the situation at hand and allow courts to come to the right result.
One critique of this approach could be that ruling that foreign sovereigns
be afforded due process protection under the United States Constitution is too
broad a holding and may have dangerous implications for other areas of the law
not contemplated here. Such a broad holding need not be reached, however.
Courts could very simply confine their holding to treating foreign sovereigns like
private parties for purposes of the Due Process Clause when applying the
commercial activities exception of the FSIA. The reasoning is clear-where
courts would treat the foreign sovereign like a private party in a commercial law
suit, then they will afford the foreign sovereign protection equal to that afforded
private parties in such situations.
V. CONCLUSION
The commercial activities exception is at the heart of the FSIA. That
exception basically states that if a foreign sovereign engages in private
commercial activities like a private party, then it should not be granted sovereign
immunity from suit in the United States. Unfortunately, the special framework
set forth in the FSIA for applying the commercial activities exception to foreign
sovereigns is confusing and has resulted in split opinions among several of the
federal circuit courts.
This Article has argued that that framework should be thrown away. It
proposes a solution that would first have courts assess whether foreign
sovereigns are in fact engaging in private commercial activities. If the answer is
"yes," then the FSIA should direct courts to simply treat the foreign sovereign in
the same way that it would treat a foreign private party for purposes of
establishing jurisdiction. Specifically, the courts should undertake the same due
process minimum contacts analysis it has undertaken for decades with respect to
foreign private parties. This solution avoids the complicated rubric established
by the FSIA and accomplishes exactly what the FSIA had wanted to accomplish.
It treats foreign sovereigns like private parties when and if they behave like
them.
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In 1812, Chief Justice Marshall presciently wrote that where a prince acts in
private commerce like a private party, the prince "may be considered as so far
laying down the prince, and assuming the character of a private individual."' 97 If
his words had been followed early on, the confusion of the past two hundred
years might have been avoided and foreign sovereigns acting like private parties
would have been treated as such.
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